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Abstract
In view of the importance of rural credit to agriculture and rural development, this paper has examined
a few structural constraints that hamper the credit delivery and has discussed some of the measures
taken to improve the situation. The public policy on rural credit in India has been focussed on
institutionalisation as a means of providing cheaper credit to farmers. As a result, the share of private
moneylenders has decreased substantially from 93 per cent in early-1950s to 31 per cent by 1991.
Disturbingly enough, they have emerged as an important source, more so for the resource-poor with
a share of 39 per cent by 2002. The multiagency system onset for giving a wide choice to farmers has
turned out to be ineffective due to deficiencies of design and architecture. Also, ailing cooperatives,
backtracked RRBs and commercial banks with waning interest in rural credit have contributed to the
ineffectiveness of the multiagency system, hampering the credit delivery. Several measures have been
taken to revitalise the system from time to time. Cooperatives are being given a package assistance
for revival following the Vaidyanathan Committee Report. RRBs have been amalgamated and are
being given capital to cleanse up their balance sheets. Commercial banks have been successfully
involved in ‘Farm Credit Package’ for doubling the credit and other initiatives of Government of
India. The SHG-bank linkage has been promoted on a large scale to supplement rural credit delivery.
But, its high transaction costs make it a costly alternative, especially when the business is handled
solely by NGOs/MFIs. A thorough overhauling of the rural credit system and its restructuring is the
need of the hour. However, it cannot be effective if done alone in isolation without revitalising the
Indian agriculture itself.
Introduction
In the post-economic reforms era, Indian
agriculture has been subjected to various external
and domestic forces that have compelled the farmers
to change their product-mix as well as organisation
of the farming. Distress has set in the rural economy
in many areas, even forcing farmers to commit
suicides as an extreme reaction. The major changes
that have directly impacted the agricultural sector
are financial sector reforms, decontrolling of
fertiliser prices, freeing of imports of agricultural
commodities, etc. Of these, the financial sector
reforms have been crucial in view of its influence
on rural credit delivery. The rural credit plays a very
crucial role in agriculture and rural economy. And,
any disturbance in its delivery mechanism can cause
cascading effects. Demand for credit emanates from
demand for inputs and services needed for various
farm operations. It constitutes a major portion of
liquidity with farmers and imparts the needed
purchasing power to the capital-starved farmers.
Public policy in the country has always been
directed towards ensuring adequate and cheaper
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credit and adopts institutionalisation of credit as the
primary focus. Significant progress has been made
in institutionalization of rural credit and the credit
supply from formal agencies to agriculture has grown
year after year, several gaps in the performance
notwithstanding.
Today, the rural credit situation looks grim in
spite of many measures and constitution of several
committees and task forces. It has been a constant
target of policy coarctation, especially after 1991
which manifested in three broad areas, viz.
enervation of the institutional architecture for rural
credit, disincentivisation of credit flow to agriculture
through the mechanical application of Basel norms,
and squeeze on resources available for agricultural
credit operations (Satish, 2007).
In this context, this paper has charted out recent
developments in the evolution of rural credit system,
highlighting a few structural constraints. The paper
has first discussed a few structural problems in the
rural credit system that hampered the credit delivery
and has then described measures taken to improve
it.
Rural Credit System — Existing Structure
In India, we have adopted multi-agency approach
to rural credit. From the initial steps to provide
Takkavi loans by the Government, cooperatives
emerged as the first institutional arrangement to
provide loans to farmers. Though Cooperative Act
came in 1904, till 1950s the progress in terms of
outreach by cooperatives was limited. This led to
the Nationalisation of Commercial Banks in 1969
and again in 1980, to step up credit supply to the
rural people. Then, came Regional Rural Banks
(RRBs) in mid-1970s. Thus, the credit architecture
consisted basically of cooperatives, commercial
banks and regional rural banks. In terms of agency-
wise share in rural credit, the progress of
institutionalisation was impressive. The share of
institutional agencies in the borrowings of cultivator
households increased from mere 7.3 per cent in 1951
to 66.3 per cent in 1991. During 1990s, the share of
non-institutional agencies increased to reach 38.9
per cent in 2002. This may be due to increased role
of dealers of various inputs in financing cultivators,
diminished interest of commercial banks in rural
finance after Financial Sector Reforms of 1991,
deterioration of health of cooperative system, among
others. Ironically, the states with higher degree of
commercialization had higher share of non-
institutional sources (Satyasai and Viswanathan,
2003).
Table 1 gives the quantum of credit flow to
agriculture during the past five years, viz. between
Table 1. Agency-wise ground level credit flow to agriculture: 2003-04 to 2007-08
(in crore Rs)
Agency 2003-04 2004-05 2005-06 2006-07 2007-08 Compound annual
growth rate (%),
2003-08
Co-operative Banks 26,875 31,231 39,404 42,480 41,813 13
(30.9) (24.9) (21.8) (18.5) (21.7)
Regional Rural Banks 7,581 12,404 15,223 20,434 22,227 30
(8.7) (9.9) (8.4) (8.9) (11.5)
Commercial Banks 52,441 81,481 1,25,477 1,66,485 1,28,495 28
(60.3) (65.0) (69.5) (72.6) (66.7)
Other agencies 84 193 382 - - -
(0.1) (0.2) (0.2)
Total 86,981 1,25,309 1,80,486 2,29,399 1,92,535 25
(100) (100) (100) (100) (100)
Note: Figures within the brackets are shares in total.
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2003-04 to 2007-08. Total ground level credit flow
increased at 25 per cent annually during this period
to peak at Rs 2,29,399 crore in 2006-07. The credit
flow from cooperative system grew at 13 per cent
per annum, the lowest among the agencies. As a
result, the share of cooperatives in the total credit
flow declined from about 31 per cent to a bit below
22 per cent during the same period.
Structural Constraints to Credit Delivery
Ineffective Multi-Agency Approach
The multi-agency system was envisaged to cater
to the diverse credit needs and benefit the rural
people by giving a wide choice of the agencies to
avail credit. But in realty, the rural clientele hardly
enjoyed the benefits of the approach as the system
suffered from deficiencies in design and architecture.
Though multiple agencies existed in the market, they
offered different products and to different target
groups. Cooperatives have two separate channels for
purveying short-term and long-term loans and never
showed any coordination between the two channels,
putting their members at a disadvantage. RRBs
served lower segments of the society which are not
generally covered by the cooperatives and
commercial banks. Due to security norms and other
procedural rigidities, hardly any scope was there for
famers to choose any other agency once they entered
into contract with any one of the agencies. Besides,
deterioration of health of the constituents, waning
of their interest in rural lending and short-sighted
policies led to dysfunctioning of the system. In what
Table 2. Health status of cooperative system in India (as on 31 March 2007)
Institution No. of No. of Accumulated
units lossmaking losses
units (in crore Rs)
State Cooperative Banks (SCBs) 31* 4 385
District Central Cooperative Banks (DCCBs) 367* 95 5681
Primary Agricultural Cooperative Credit Societies (PACS) 1,08,779 40,388 6,862
[Data as on 31 March 2005]
State Cooperative Agriculture and Rural Development Banks (SCARDBs) 20 8 912
Primary Cooperative Agriculture and Rural Development Banks (PCARDB) 727 324 2734
Notes: * Six SCBs and 136 DCCBs are not complying with the minimum capital requirements as specified under
Section 11 of Banking Regulation Act, 1949 (as applicable to cooperative societies).
Source: Cooperative Credit Structure: An Overview-2004-05, NABARD.
follows, we highlight a few key problems in the
constituent agencies in the rural credit system that
reduced the effectiveness of the system.
Cooperative System in Muddle
A serious drag on the multi-agency approach is
the ineffective cooperative system. Poor health, lack
of adaptation to the needs, politicisation, loss of
member orientation and credibility inter alia
disoriented the system. Table 2 gives the health of
the cooperative system in the country. It can be easily
seen from the table that cooperative system is
incapacitated due to heavy losses which invariably
increased over the past few years. Cooperatives are
ailing in most of the districts and lost their eligibility
for NABARD’s refinance. This impaired their ability
to lend fresh loans and hence, their borrowers lose
their freedom to choose the agency or product.
Cooperative system displayed inherent rigidity
and did not change with times. It grew bigger in size
over time. But, it did not adopt the technology and
professionalism needed to manage the structure. Nor
it resorted to the restructuring needed. Integration
of short-term and long-term structures of
cooperatives was mooted by Hazari Committee way
back in 1976 as a measure to impart cost economies
besides offering all the services through a single
window. Except Andhra Pradesh, where integration
was done in mid-1980s, no other state pursued this
seriously, in spite the positive feed back from Andhra
Pradesh experience (Ramireddy, 1996; Satyasai and
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for restructuring of the cooperative system is
delayering which means removing one tier in the
system. As we know, cooperatives have two or three
tiers in different states. Either the middle (district
level) or top (state level) layer can be removed
(Satyasai and Badatya, 2000).
Backtracked RRBs
RRBs were designed to combine local feel and
low cost of the cooperatives and professionalism of
commercial banks. Somewhere the hybridization
process went wrong and what emerged finally was
the high cost structure and culture of commercial
banks. Due to the restrictions on their client base
and the cap on the rate of interest they can charge on
their loans, many of them incurred heavy losses.
Capital was infused and RRBs were allowed to lend
to non-target population and as of now RRBs can
lend to anyone without any restriction and are almost
on par with any other commercial bank in business
scope.
 The performance of RRBs had not been very
impressive all along. One reason often quoted is their
faulty design, as they were to lend at lower rates
than their cost of funds. The net profit of RRBs at
the aggregate level increased from Rs 617.13 crore
during 2005-06 to Rs 625.15 crore during 2006-07.
The net worth of RRBs increased to Rs 4,526.48
crore during 2006-07, an increase of 13 per cent over
the previous year. The performance of RRBs varied
widely across regions. While all RRBs were in profit
in the southern region, 29 (out of 31) in central, 14
(out of 16) in northern, 9 (out of 10) in western, 9
(out of 10) in eastern and 5 (out of 8) in north-eastern
regions were in profit (NABARD, 2008).
Shrinkage in Commercial Banks’ Involvement
Public sector commercial banks played a major
role in rural transformation since their first phase of
nationalization in 1969. Rural branches increased
in number and banking network spread across the
country. Commercial banks’ share in total
institutional credit also kept on increasing over time
to reach over 60 per cent by 2003-04 (Mohan, 2006).
However, after the Financial Sector Reforms, 1991,
the commercial banks were asked to show
profitability and viability and follow prudential
norms of income recognition and asset classification.
Added to this, a host of new private sector banks
were permitted and foreign banks were allowed to
operate, thereby mounting heavy competitive
pressure on the public sector commercial banks. The
public sector commercial banks entered into a race
with the private and foreign banks for the urban
segment rather than concentrating on semi-urban and
rural segments where they have heavy presence and
initial advantage.
As a result of liberalization in branch licensing
policy, the rural branches dwindled in numbers after
1991, both in absolute and relative sense. The
proportion of rural branches declined from 57 per
cent in 1990-91 to 44.5 per cent in 2005-06 (Table
3). On an average, number of rural branches came
down by 260 every year.
As a result of reduction in number of branches
and general relaxation in the emphasis on priority
sector lending, commercial banks’ involvement in
rural credit declined. The major brunt appears to have
been borne by the weaker sections. Inequitable
distribution of branch network and credit flow across
regions is already well documented. Imagine the
plight of weaker sections in a region with weak
banking spread! The Situation Assessment Survey
(SAS) of Farmers (59th Round NSSO) conducted in
the year 2003, has estimated that over 50 per cent of
farm households were financially excluded with a
relatively higher proportion of exclusion among
small and marginal farmers and tribals (NSSO,
2005). As per Chavan (2007), commercial banks
were the most important source of credit for the dalit
households in 1992 and the share of debt from
commercial banks to dalits sharply declined between
1992 and 2002. The vacuum, thus created, was filled
Table 3. Number and proportion of rural branches of
commercial banks
Year Number of Percentage
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primarily by professional moneylenders. While
professional moneylenders did emerge in 2002 as
an important source of credit for other rural
households as well, their hold was much stronger
over dalit households than other households.
Commercial banks data also indicated a growing
failure on the part of domestic banks to meet the
targets set for “weaker sections” (which included
dalits) after 1991. This finding has serious
implications as, going by the history, high cost credit
was used to rob the poor of their assets like land.
Less dangerous, though ubiquitous, are the linked
credit transactions where farmers may lose
substantially and have been widely reported in the
literature. A trader giving credit and indirectly
forcing, with likelihood of exploitation, the farmer
to sell through him in the product market is a common
feature in the rural areas.
Yet another reason for the reduced commercial
banking activity in rural areas is the staff
restructuring. At one point in time, say, for about
decade and a half after the bank nationalisation,
public sector commercial banks recruited
professional staff (agricultural graduates and other
specialists). From 1990s onwards, in the wake of
the much hyped VRS scheme, they had to manage
their business operations through a handful of not-
so-well-suited personnel in many branches. This
naturally reduced the outreach as well as quality in
lending. Rural lending in a country like India is
manpower-intensive and the cost control through
staff pruning would be self-defeating and counter
productive.
It appears that the number of agencies in a
system, thus, may not matter as much as their
commitment to the rural development and
adaptability to the emerging demands.
Efforts to Improve Credit Delivery
Revitalisation of Cooperative System
Several initiatives were taken from time to time
based on the recommendations of many committees
to suggest ways to revitalise the cooperatives with
limited success. Recently, Government of India has
announced revival package based on the
recommendations of the Task Force on Short-Term
Rural Co-operative Credit Structure (STCCS)
(Chairman: Dr A. Vaidyanathan), with an outlay of
Rs 13,596 crore. The assistance is to be provided
for cleansing the balance sheets of STCCS (as on 31
March 2004), capital infusion to ensure CRAR of 7
per cent, technical support for building up common
accounting and internal control system,
computerisation, etc. NABARD has been actively
involved in administering the programme and
training the staff, board members and other elected
representatives of PACS. Importantly, at end-March
2008, six states (Andhra Pradesh, Gujarat, Haryana,
Madhya Pradesh, Orissa and Uttar Pradesh) have
passed bills to amend their Co-operative Societies
Act (CSA) and Maharashtra has promulgated an
Ordinance. As on 31 March 2008, the total support
released to states reached Rs 3,659.05 crore,
including state government share of Rs 333.93 crore.
The Government of India has also announced
similar package for Long-Term Co-operative Credit
Structure (LTCCS), based on the report of the Task
Force under the Chairmanship of Prof. A.
Vaidyanathan in the Union Budget 2008-09. The
financial assistance is estimated at Rs 4,584 crore
as well as legal and institutional reforms.
How quickly the cooperatives can be revived to
be able to serve their members and how much
confidence and sense of belongingness can be
imparted among the members through trainings is a
big question. Financial revival may take place soon.
But, revival in true sense may take decades, if at all
(EPWRF, 2007).
One major drawback in the cooperative system
is that credit and marketing cooperative systems are
separate and are never integrated functionally. True
multipurpose societies with credit and marketing
(non-financial) services can improve the viability of
PACS and provide one-stop solutions to farmers to
enhance their viability too.
Two important structural changes took place in
RRBs in recent years. First is the amalgamation of
RRBs according to sponsor commercial bank from
2005-06 onwards. As a result, the number of RRBs
has been reduced from 196 to 96 as on 31 March
2007. Second, RRBs are directed to cover hitherto392 Agricultural Economics Research Review    Vol.21   (Conference Number)  2008
uncovered districts in the Union Budget 2007-08.
That is, 49 hitherto uncovered districts will be
covered by them as notified by Government of India
and 11 districts are under consideration for
notification. Of the 678 proposed branches, 268 were
opened as at end-March 2008.
The recapitalisation support announced by
Hon’ble Finance Minister in the Union Budget 2007-
08, will be extended to RRBs with negative net worth
in a phased manner. As at end-March 2008, out of
96 RRBs, 27 (28%) had negative net worth, requiring
recapitalisation support worth Rs 1,795.97 crore (Rs
66.5 crore/RRB). The Government of India, sponsor
banks and sate governments will contribute in the
ratio of 50:35:15. Six state governments have
contributed their share to 12 RRBs, fully or partly,
so far.
Kisan Credit Card (KCC) Scheme
The Kisan Credit Card (KCC) scheme,
introduced in August 1998, has facilitated flexible,
easy and timely credit delivery to farmers. KCC can
be used to avail crop loans, term loans and
consumption loans. Of the total 714.68 lakh cards
issued as on 31 March 2008, co-operative banks
accounted for 49 per cent of the share, followed by
commercial banks (37%) and RRBs (14%). Kisan
Credit Card improved the farmers’ accessibility to
bank credit, simplified credit delivery procedures and
provided more flexibility in use of credit. However,
some areas of concern remain to be addressed like
low level of awareness among farmers with reference
to the right use of KCC, inoperative accounts, etc.
Farm Credit Package
In 2004, Government of India announced a
package for doubling the credit flow to agriculture,
from Rs 80,000 crore in 2003-04, in three years. On
account of concerted efforts, the target was achieved
in just two years by adopting various measures like
revision of scales of finance, units costs, coverage
of new farmers, issue of comprehensive credit cards,
etc. While the quantum jump was impressive
overtime, there was sub-sectoral bias towards farm
mechanisation and refocus on irrigation, land
development, horticulture, agro-processing is
necessary (BCCI, 2008).
Self-Help Group (SHG) - Bank Linkage and
Micro-Finance Institutes (MFIs)
As we have seen earlier, some sections of the
population remained without access to formal
banking channels. A micro-finance programme was
started in the country to supplement the efforts of
formal banking system and provide access to banking
services to large masses. The SHG - Bank Linkage
Programme in India started as a pilot project of
linking 500 self-help groups across the country
during 1992-1995 (Pilot testing period), followed by
mainstreaming during 1996-1998 and expansion
since 1998 onwards. Beginning with a modest
number of 255 SHGs being linked during 1992-93,
25,84,729 SHGs were linked with banks by February
2007. Micro-finance Institutions (MFIs), institutions
other than banks that are engaged in provision of
financial services to the poor, emerged to fill the gap
due to poor network of banks. The cost of delivery
was, however, very high in channels with
involvement of NGOs alone. Puhazhendhi (2007)
has estimated the cost of delivery of Rs 100 credit
under various models based on studies in three states
of Rajasthan, Tamil Nadu and West Bengal. The
comparative estimates are given in Table 4.
Cost of delivery through SHGs includes two
components – cost of promotion and nurturing the
group and cost of delivery. While transaction cost is
maximum in the Model III, where MFI acts as the
promoting and financing agency, the major
component is cost of promotion. Mostly this can be
one-time cost in the first one or two years. In
subsequent years, the cost of nurturing, or more
precisely, cost of keeping the herd together, can be
minimal in Model III, as groups formed by MFIs are
likely to remain intact for a longer period since they
spend more time with the groups during the
formation and thereafter. In any event, the fact
remains that models with involvement of banks turn
out to be cheaper in credit delivery due to higher
loan volumes and less time spent on delivery,
perhaps, due to their experience. Also, the SHG
linkage is concentrated mostly in southern parts of
India and has not spread to areas where bank network
is poor (Satyasai, 2000). Hence, the programme
cannot be expected to yield miraculous results in
terms of correcting the imbalances in the outreach.Satyasai : Rural Credit Delivery in India 393
Summary and Conclusions
Public policy on rural credit in India has been
focussed on institutionalisation as a means of
providing cheaper credit to farmers. As a result, the
share of private moneylenders had decreased
substantially from 93 per cent in early-1950s to 31
per cent by 1991. Disturbingly enough, they have
emerged as an important source, more so for the
resource-poor with a share of 39 per cent by 2002.
The multiagency system onset for giving a wider
choice to farmers has turned out to be ineffective
due to deficiencies of design and architecture. Also,
ailing cooperatives, backtracked RRBs and
commercial banks with waning interest in rural credit
have contributed to the ineffectiveness of the
multiagency system, hampering the credit delivery.
Several measures have been taken to revitalise the
system from time to time. Cooperatives are given a
package assistance for revival following
Vaidyanathan Committee Report. RRBs have been
amalgamated and are being given capital to cleanse
up their balance sheets. Commercial banks have been
successfully involved in Farm Credit Package for
doubling the credit and other initiatives of
Government of India. The SHG-bank linkage has
been promoted on a large scale to supplement rural
credit delivery. But, the high transaction costs make
it a costly alternative, especially when the business
is handled solely by NGOs/MFIs. A thorough
overhauling of the rural credit system and its
restructuring is the need of the hour. However, it
cannot be effective if done alone in isolation without
revitalising the Indian agriculture itself.
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